2024-03-29T09:57:15Zhttp://oai-repositori.upf.edu/oai/requestoai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/345912018-05-10T07:46:20Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Farrando Miguel, Ignacio
author
2018
The multiple judicial decisions in favour of those who invested in Bankia's IPO have posed a serious problem for this major Spanish credit institution. This situation has been made even more complicated for the bank by the two judgements recently issued by the Supreme Court, whereby the invalidity of the purchase of shares was acknowledged and the bank was ordered to refund the investments made by the plaintiffs.
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/34591
Bankia's IPO: some remarks on the biggest failure in the Spanish banking system
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/427932020-01-16T11:12:08Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Galetta, Diana-Urania
author
Hofmann, Herwig
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Mir Puigpelat, Oriol
author
Ziller, Jacques
author
2015
Upon request by the JURI Committee this in-depth analysis explains what general principles of EU administrative procedural law are, and how they can be formulated in the recitals of a Regulation on EU administrative procedure.
Galetta DU, Hofmann HCH, Mir Puigpelat O, Ziller, Jacques. The general principles of EU administrative procedural law. Brussels: European Parliament; 2015. 22 p. DOI: 10.2861/663904
9789282373385
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/42793
https://doi.org/10.2861/663904
The general principles of EU administrative procedural law
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/427942020-01-17T08:18:35Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Galetta, Diana-Urania
author
Hofmann, Herwig
author
Mir Puigpelat, Oriol
author
Ziller, Jacques
author
2015
This study was commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee. It provides for an analysis of and comments on the proposal for a Regulation on EU administrative procedural law prepared by the project team supporting the Working Group on Administrative Law and endorsed by the latter Working Group.The purpose of this Regulation is fostering compliance with the general principles of EU law, reducing the fragmentation of applicable rules, improving transparency and allowing for simplification of Union legislation by establishing a concise basic set of procedural provisions common to multiple policies.
Galetta DU, Hofmann HCH, Mir Puigpelat O, Ziller, Jacques. The context and legal elements of a proposal for a regulation on the administrative procedure of the European Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Brussels: European Parliament; 2015. 48 p. DOI: 10.2861/52768
9789282385326
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/42794
https://doi.org/10.2861/52768
The context and legal elements of a proposal for a regulation on the administrative procedure of the European Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/435542020-02-13T02:31:02Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Lucchi, Nicola
author
2013
The paper discusses the scientific and policy debate as to whether access to the Internet can be considered so fundamental for human interaction as to deserve a special legal protection. In particular, it examines the impact of computer-mediated communication on the realization of individual’s rights and freedoms as well as on democratization processes. It then considers how Internet content governance is posing regulatory issues directly related to the growing importance of an equitable access to digital information. In this regard, the paper looks at conflicts arising within the systems of rights and obligations attached to communication (and especially content provision) over the Internet. The paper finally concludes by identifying emerging tensions and drawing out the implications for the nature and definitions of rights (e.g. of communication and access, but also of intellectual property ownership) and for regulations and actions taken to protect, promote or qualify those rights. All these points are illustrated by a series of recent examples.
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/43554
The role of internet access in enabling individual's rights and freedoms
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/472602021-04-30T09:23:56Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Olsaretti, Serena
author
2021-04-29
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47260
Having children is a morally significant choice: an interview with Serena Olsaretti
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/473332021-06-07T11:51:13Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Olsaretti, Serena
author
2021
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47333
Parental justice
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/473342021-06-07T11:53:28Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Bou-Habib, Paul
author
Olsaretti, Serena
author
2021
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47334
Children or migrants as public goods?
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/477592021-06-07T12:00:58Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Olsaretti, Serena
author
2021
In academic and public debates, defenders of the case for sharing the costs of children (“socialisation”, for short) have often claimed that by having and rearing children parents produce public goods for the rest of society, or perform socially valuable, indeed necessary, labour, and that it would be unfair to parents to not share the costs of children for this reason. Whether a version of this argument (which I loosely refer to as the “public goods argument”) can be defended depends, among other things, on whether there is a defensible normative principle that can vindicate this charge of unfairness: why exactly is it unfair, to producers of public goods or those who willingly engage in socially valuable activities, not to share in the costs of production of those goods? And can this unfairness charge be made about parents? Critics of the public goods argument have claimed that it fails because there is no independently defensible principle that can serve to buttress the claims of parents.
This paper examines the possibility of enlisting the ideal of equality of resources defended by Ronald Dworkin to provide the normative underpinning of a version of the public goods argument. Although Dworkin himself does not address the question of how the costs of children should be shared in a just society, and although his view has been taken to be inhospitable to the case for socialisation, I claim that equality of resources can, in fact, provide the bases for that case. In order to argue for this conclusion, the paper does two main things. First, it offers an interpretation of the theory of equality of resources that avoids what I view as certain misconceptions regarding some aspects of that theory. Most importantly, I suggest that the role, in equality of resources, of both people’s identification with their lifeplans or ambitions, and that of the so-called envy test, are more circumscribed than we might think, and that, by contrast, the role of the idea of true opportunity costs as the metric of equality is more central than has generally been noticed. Second, I suggest that, in order to make the case for socialisation, we should focus on a part of the ideal of equality of resources that is generally under-discussed – the view’s treatment of what I call productive fairness. Once we keep these points in mind, I claim, equality of resources, contrary to received wisdom, turns out to be hospitable, not inimical, to one important argument for socialisation.
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/47759
Equality of resources and the public goods argument
oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/525872022-03-01T02:31:47Zcom_10230_25483com_10230_3col_10230_34557
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Oberman, Kieran
author
2022
A common argument against lockdowns is that they restrict freedom. On this view, lockdowns might be effective in protecting public health, but their impact on freedom is purely negative. This article challenges that view. It argues that while lockdowns restrict freedom, so too do viruses. Since viruses restrict freedom, and lockdowns protect us from viruses, lockdowns can protect us from the harmful effects that viruses have upon freedom. The problem we face is not necessarily freedom vs public health. Sometimes it is freedom itself – or its value or distribution - that provides reason for lockdowns.
Forthcoming in Ethics
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/52587
Freedom and viruses